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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Research on tax elasticities in South Africa mainly employs linear models and shows that taxes 
evolve symmetrically irrespective of the economic cycle. This study extends this research to show 
that taxes behave asymmetrically and nonlinearly during expansions and contractions. Estimated 
linear elasticities imply that a one percent expansion in the cycle increases personal income tax, 
corporate income tax and value added tax by 1.43, 2.52 and 0.99 percent, respectively. However, 
estimated nonlinear elasticities are significantly different. During an expansion, the above 
elasticities increase by 1.89, 2.76 and 2.17 percent, respectively while during a contraction phase 
these elasticities increase by 0.89, 0.88 and 0.82 respectively. This finding of low tax collection 
during economic contractions has important implications for fiscal sustainability and overall 
fiscal prudence in South Africa. The findings of high tax elasticities during expansions might 
explain the underestimation of revenue by the government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he global economy is faced with structural adjustments as financial markets fail. Large fiscal deficits 
incurred by governments during the financial crisis represented a coordinated effort by countries to 
save jobs and minimize the extent to which the economic growth declined. The G20 summit in 
March 2009 and the recent World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2010 announced that discretionary 
spending by most countries should exceed two percent of GDP.  
 
Countries’ economies are also responding in the form of automatic stabilizers where revenues fall and 
unemployment insurance increases, thus putting more pressure on the fiscal deficit. It is important that governments 
manage their fiscal deficits appropriately to avoid possible debt burdens. This study uses a measure of discretionary 
fiscal policy for South Africa to assess the fiscal stance during different phases of the economic cycle by explicitly 
testing for and using nonlinear tax elasticity adjustments. 
 
This study also explores the asymmetric behaviour of revenues over the business cycle. In particular, a 
regime-switching framework is employed, where the transition from one regime to the other occurs in a smooth 
way.  The switching between regimes is controlled by the state of output.  This feature of the smooth transition 
model allows us to test the ability of high against low output regimes and to best describe the nonlinear dynamics of 
tax elasticities in the South African economy. In the case of South Africa, business cycle expansions and 
contractions can last as long as four years (see 2008q4 quarterly bulletin, s-159, for the duration of expansions and 
contractions), so the assumption that tax elasticities are of a short-term nature might be fallible. This paper proposes 
that long-term tax elasticities, as in the case of Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007), vary over the business cycle. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model and compare across regimes the South African tax revenue 
T 
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relationship with respect to the business cycles using a non-linear model of fiscal adjustment. Using recursive and 
rolling estimates for the nonlinear regressions, this paper therefore contributes to a set of other studies in estimating 
the tax elasticities. 
 
Our main finding is that the elasticities for various taxes are significantly different in regimes of economic 
expansions and contractions. Adjusting the structural budget balance for asymmetric effects is just an extension 
from using linear elasticities. It allows the policy maker to draw from a different set of analysing tools when setting 
the expenditure envelope based on forecasted revenue. The large elasticities during economic expansions provide a 
possible explanation for the underestimation of tax revenues. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The context of tax evolution in South Africa has undergone significant changes. South Africa has witnessed 
three government appointed commissions on aspects of the tax structure. These were the Franzsen commission in 
1968, the Margo commission in 1987 and the Katz commission in 1994 (Black et al., 2005). As discussed in these 
commissions, South African authorities have, but for isolated events, implemented discretionary counter cyclical 
fiscal policy post 1994 due to adverse economic shocks. The South African economy has also gone through 
important tax reforms since the 1960s. Toward the end of the 1970s, indications that authorities were beginning to 
abandon counter cyclical policy arose in favour of longer term fiscal planning (Calitz in Black et al., 2005). Personal 
income tax no longer had strong automatic stabilizing effects due to bracket creep and tax rate adjustments.  
Furthermore, the Treasury was under pressure to reduce government expenditure which limited its ability to either 
cool the economy off or stimulate it. In particular, a long cyclical downswing from 1989 to 1993 depressed tax 
revenues while social services raised government expenditure. Government revenue dropped from 25.1 percent of 
GDP in 1989/1990 to 21.7 percent in 1992/1993, while expenditures increased from 26.5 percent to 28.9 percent. 
The conventional budget deficit thus increased from 1.4 percent to 7.3 percent during that period, which resulted in 
higher debt of a peak of 50.4 percent to GDP in 1995. With a clearer focus on counter cyclical fiscal policy, the 
government was able to reduce the deficit from 2003 onwards, the result also being lower levels of debt (25 percent 
of GDP in 2008/2009). During the global economic slowdown in 2008 through to 2010, South Africa is once again 
faced with similar difficulties.  
 
Tax revenues are highly dependent on business cycles. An expansion in a business cycle improves revenue 
collection as automatic stabilizers and people’s willingness to pay taxes improves. However, when the economy is 
in a downturn, automatic stabilizers act conversely, people delay or simply cannot meet their tax obligations, which 
ultimately leads to a worsening of revenue collection. In terms of corporate income tax, companies can write off 
losses made in a current year, next year. Therefore, it is important to take note that revenue collections might not 
respond symmetrically to business cycles. Wolswijk (2007) argues that short-term elasticities sometimes exceed 
their long-run counterparts and often behave asymmetrically. The tax base may also remain stable regardless of the 
cycle, where revenue collected varies. A simple example of this would be wage rigidities present in South Africa’s 
labour market, or specifically the inability to adjust wages down during an economic contraction. In theory, true 
long-term elasticities of taxes should be equal to unity. However, over the medium and short term, these elasticities 
can significantly exceed the “true” long-run estimates. A persistent economic expansion can shift consumption 
patterns to more luxury-based goods. The counter argument would seem that a contraction in the cycle will 
symmetrically shift this pattern. The problem with this statement lies specifically in the structure of South African 
households and firms. Spending patterns between various income groups are highly heterogeneous. Income 
inequality is another example of how taxes can respond asymmetrically over the cycle. When the economy enters a 
recession, it is the lower end of the labour market which bears the majority of lay-offs. However, most of income 
taxes come from the higher end of the income distribution where spending patterns might be more stable over the 
cycle. A final issue to consider is possible indirect effects of a change to a specific tax base relative to other bases. 
An example of this is higher company profits that lead to higher wages and ultimately higher levels of consumption.  
 
Studies on tax elasticities for South Africa have received some attention due to the context of its economy. 
These studies focused primarily on linear estimation methods. Swanepoel and Schoeman (2002) estimate constant 
tax elasticities over the cycle. Their study shows that a one percent widening of the output gap results in a decrease 
of 0.2 percent in tax revenue. Du Plessis and Boshoff (2007) define the output gap in terms of a structural vector 
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autoregression and estimate long-run elasticities for various taxes over the cycle. Their results show almost a one to 
one relationship for personal income tax, corporate income tax and value-added taxes over the cycle. Lizondo et al. 
(2006) find that taxes respond significantly differently than unity over changes in the economic cycle.  This study 
marks a significant point of departure from previous papers in that it examines tax revenue/elasticity variations over 
business cycles. These estimates are then used to further adjust the budget balance. Government’s conventional 
budgets reflect both temporary and permanent factors of the economy.  
 
Failure to distinguish between the temporary and permanent factors can reduce the extent to which fiscal 
policy can intervene in times of recessions and save in times of economic expansions. Various measures analyze 
whether fiscal policy is sustainable over the cycle. One such measure is the structural budget balance (hereafter 
SBB). The SBB is the budget that would have prevailed once all cyclical components have been removed from the 
budget, or put differently, “it is the residual balance after purging the actual balance from the estimated budgetary 
consequences of the business cycle” (Hagemann, 1999:3). The calculation of the SBB involves estimating 
elasticities. Girourd and André (2005) estimate tax elasticities in the calculation of the SBB for OECD countries. 
They use OLS regressions to capture both marginal and average tax rates where the product of the two yields tax 
elasticities over the economic cycle.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The structural budget balance (SBB) is defined as that component of the budget that depends on the long 
term trend of the economy, as represented by the long run path of output. This underlying path is subjected to 
permanent and temporary shocks (as is in the case of Blanchard and Quah, 1989). Technological shocks have a 
lasting impact over time, whereas transitory shocks dissipate over time, resulting in cyclical movements of actual 
output around potential output (Lizondo, 2006). “Failure to distinguish between temporary and permanent influences 
on the budget may cause fiscal levers to be over or under adjusted in response to budgetary developments” 
(Hagemann 1999:3). If fiscal policy is unchecked in this regard, it can lead to an accumulation of debt and become a 
form of fiscal dynamic time inefficiency (intended fiscal policy that is geared to be counter cyclical, but because of 
red tape and policy lags, becomes pro cyclical, which reduces the credibility of overall fiscal policy). 
 
This paper only adjusts for cyclical revenues and assumes that fiscal expenditures are exogenous to the 
cycle. Except for the unemployment insurance fund (UIF), expenditures are seen as purely discretionary. UIF 
constitutes a small component of fiscal expenditures and is thus left unadjusted. 
Formally, the SBB is derived as follows: 
y,tε
t
*
t
i,t
*
i,t
6
1i
*
tt0
*
i,t
*
)
y
y
(TT
where
y/]XG)T[(b
=
+=
=
∑ -
 (1) 
yt* is potential output 
yt* is observed output 
Tt* is the cyclically adjusted tax for the various taxes 
G0 is unadjusted government expenditure 
Xt is nontax revenue minus capital and net interest spending 
εt,y is the estimated revenue elasticity regarding the cycle 
 
The basic identity (equation 1) states that the SBB equals tax revenue adjusted for the economic cycle less 
government expenditures expressed as a percent of potential GDP and non-tax revenue as a percent of GDP. The tax 
revenue is adjusted for the cycle by incorporating a measure of average and marginal taxes through the estimated 
elasticities. 
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Instead of estimating cyclical revenues for all the taxes, this study mainly focuses on the three major 
revenues; namely, personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and value-added taxes (VAT), which 
constitute eighty percent of all taxes. 
 
The output gap is defined as the difference between observed output from potential output. Potential output 
is derived using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) as in Du Plessis, Smit and Sturzenegger (2007). To be 
robust, this study also uses the Hodrik Prescott filter to measure the output gap. The SVAR approach has the 
advantage of not assuming that potential GDP is a function of some statistical property, but rather a function of the 
underlying economy. Potential GDP is then a function of fiscal expenditure as a percent of GDP and real interest 
rates.  
 
Following Girourd and Andre (2005), the respective elasticities, where the elasticity of taxes (PIT, CIT and 
VAT) over the cycle is derived, are as follows: 
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  for j=wage bill, profits and consumption  
 
Where: 
 
yti ,
  = total elasticity of tax revenue to the output gap. 
i
i
t
tb  = the elasticity of the different taxes with respect to the various tax bases (first step). 
iy
tb  = the elasticity of the various tax bases with respect to the output gap (second step). 
 
The reduced form elasticities combine tax contributions relative to the output gap by combining estimates 
of tax proceeds to changes in the tax base with estimates of the sensitivity of the tax base to the cycle (Girourd and 
André, 2005). They are then defined as follows: 
 
The elasticity for PIT is defined by:  
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where yt ,  is the elasticity of personal income tax with respect to the output gap, wl,t  is the elasticity of personal 
income tax to the wage bill, where w is the wage rate and l is employment, and ywl,  is the elasticity of the wage 
bill to the output gap. 
 
 
 
The elasticity for CIT is defined by:  
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where yt ,  is the elasticity of corporate income tax with respect to the output gap, PS is the profit share in GDP, Z is 
the gross operating surplus and 
y
wl
 is the elasticity of the wage bill to the output gap; i.e., one can calculate the 
elasticity of corporate income tax with the following formula: 
  
PS
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The elasticity for VAT is defined by:  
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where yt ,  is the elasticity of value-added tax with respect to the output gap, 
t
csl
 is the elasticity of value-added tax 
to consumption and 
y
csl
  is the elasticity of consumption to the output gap. V is VAT and Cs refers to the tax base, 
which is consumption. 
 
Preliminary analysis, using standard Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, suggests that the tax and tax base 
variables are I(1), as summarized in Table 1. This paper compares elasticities to that of Du Plessis and Boshoff 
(2008), Swanepoel and Schoeman (2002) and Jooste (2009). The regression techniques used by these authors are all 
different. Du Plessis and Boshoff (2008) estimate long-run tax elasticities using a VAR. Swanepoel and Schoeman 
(2002) estimate their elasticities with standard OLS regressions whereas Jooste (2009) uses a Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) to estimate the reduced form elasticities. This paper, however, uses the term medium-
term elasticity as opposed to long-run elasticities since the latter should, in theory, be close to one. 
    
 
 
Table 1: Stationarity Tests 
ADF tests in levels (P values) 
PIT CIT VAT Wage bill Profits Consumption Output gap 
0.661 0.222 0.636 0.854 0.213 0.798 0.086 
ADF tests in differences (P values) 
0.000 0.001 0.003 0.019 0.641 0.083 0.218 
 
 
This paper departs from the previous studies by sidestepping the proposed two-step approach
1
 and employs 
a framework using the smooth threshold regressive (STR, henceforth), which is a variant of the smooth threshold 
autoregressive (STAR) model, as proposed by Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and van Dijk et al. (2002). This model 
is an extension to the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, as originally proposed by Tong and Lim (1980), in that 
the transition from one state to another is smooth rather than discrete. 
 
Since the aim of the paper is to estimate the medium and short-term elasticities over the different phases of 
the cycle, it has to ensure that variables are stationary in the STR model (in our case, taxes and respective bases are 
I(1) variables).  Differencing the variables yields inconclusive results. Also faced with the problem of estimating an 
I(0) variable, the output gap, with I(1) variables, it is natural to extend the STR model in incorporating it into an 
autoregressive distributive lag model of order p and n, ARDL(p,n). The ARDL sets p=1 and n=1 on the basis of the 
Akaike Information Criterion. The ARDL model has the advantage of establishing long-run relationships, 
irrespective of whether variables are integrated of order 1 or 0 and is defined as: 
 
                                                 
1 Girourd and André (2005 estimate two elasticities, one regarding taxes to the tax base and the other regarding the tax base to the 
output gap.  
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where T refers to the tax and TB to the tax base. Pesaran and Shin (1998) then used a variant of the standard ARDL 
equation for cointegration where T is related to contemporaneous TB, differenced TBs and lagged T:  
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A further variant relates T to TB and differences in both variables and renders the error correction term  
( 1tTˆ  ) as in Wickens and Breusch (1988): 
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where the long-run estimate is calculated as: 
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In establishing whether cointegration is present, Hasser and Wolters (2006) run Monte Carlo simulations 
and show that Banerjee et al’s. (1998) suggestion of using the conventional student t-test is just as powerful as 
Boswijk’s (1994) suggested F-test. Next, the ARDL version is augment STR model. This allows us to study the 
dynamics of taxes over the cycle where it relates to the tax base.  This side steps the estimation method proposed by 
Girourd and André (2005) where one has to estimate two elasticities, to estimating it directly. The standard STR 
model for the nonlinear tax elasticities can be defined as follows: 
 
tdtttt
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where )'x,...,x;TB,1(z t,mt,11tt   is the vector of explanatory variables, with h=n+2+m. The parameters 
)',...,,( 10 h  and )',...,,( 10 h   represent ((h+1)*1) parameters in the linear and nonlinear parts 
of the model, respectively. The disturbance term is assumed to be identically and independently distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance, i.e. ),0(~
2 iidt . The transition function ),,( scG  is assumed to be 
continuous and bounded in the transition variable ts (i.e., the output gap). In d-ts , d is defined as lags 1, 2,…,T. 
As 0),,(,  tt scGs  and as 1),,(,  tt scGs  . Our nonlinear function approximates a 
smooth logistic function where ),,( scG   is modelled as follows: 
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This transition function is a monotonically increasing function of ts , where the slope parameter indicates 
the smoothness from one transition to another. The location parameter c determines where the transition occurs. 
Furthermore, the STR model is equivalent to a linear model with stochastically time varying coefficients and can be 
written as: 
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TtzTzscGT tttttt ,...,1')],,(''[    (9) 
 
Given that ),,( scG  is bounded between 0 and 1, the combined parameters, , will fluctuate between   
and    and change monotonically as a function of ts . The more the transition variable moves beyond the 
threshold, the closer ),,( scG  will be to one and the closer the parameters   will be to   . The further ts
approaches the threshold, c, the closer the parameters   will be to  . 
 
To augment our ARDL model with the STR methodology we proceed as follows: 
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tT  is the tax base for PIT, CIT and VAT at time t. Next the vector 
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  where TB represents the various tax bases for 
the wage bill, profits and consumption at time t.  
 
This study follows Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making  dimension-free by 
dividing it by the variance of c. To find the optimal values for c and   that minimise the residual sum of squares, a 
grid search is conducted using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shano (BFGS) algorithm.  
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Data Description 
 
South African quarterly data for the 1994q1-2009q3 period is used to estimate the tax elasticities. These 
elasticities are then used to calculate the structural budget balance. Government expenditure data can directly be 
downloaded from the South African Reserve Bank.  For the wage bill, we use compensation of employees as a base 
for PIT. For profits, we use total gross operating surplus as a base for CIT. Consumption is used as the base for 
VAT.
2
  
 
Two sorts of tests for linearity are used. Table 2 provides the, Brock, Dechert and Sheinkman (BDS) (1987) 
test of any nonlinearity in the two models proposed by Girourd and André (2005). It tests whether the errors of the 
cointegrated model are correctly specified under the null of identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) errors 
against the alternative of an unspecified nonlinear process. The test can be used to test possible deviations from 
linear dependency or chaos.
3
 The results of different embedding dimensions and the standard deviations of the 
residuals are reported. The results in Table 2 clearly reject the null of linearity for the embedding dimensions for 
PIT, VAT and CIT. 
4
 
 
  
                                                 
4 Data can be directly downloaded from the South African Reserve Bank website. Codes are: Government expenditure (S-
47:4601m), compensation of employees (6240L), PIT (S-46:4570m), consumption (6007L) and VAT (S-46:4578m) 
3 Refer to Eviews 6 User’s Guide for a more detailed discussion on the BDS test. 
4 Using different standard deviations yields the same conclusion. 
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Table 2:  BDS Test 
BDS test σ=0.05 
Dimensions ResidProfits (P values) ResidWageB (P values) ResidCons (P values) 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dimensions ResidCIT (P values) ResidPIT (P values) ResidVAT (P values) 
2 0.309 0.075 0.022 
3 0.000 0.000 0.011 
 
 
After having rejected that the model is linear, the next step is to apply the test by Teräsvirta (1994) in 
Escribano and Jordá (2001) to select the proper nonlinear functional form between a logistic transition regression 
and an exponential transition regression. Table 3, which provides the p-values for Teräsvirta’s HO2 and HO3 tests, 
shows evidence in favour of LSTAR for PIT, CIT and VAT. 
 
 
Table 3:  Linearity Test 
Transition variable 
Hypothesis Wage bill (P values) Profits (P values) Consumption (P values) 
H03 0.97 0.45 0.58 
H02 0.79 0.87 0.74 
 
 
For the recursive estimates, we estimate over fixed windows of data, where the first data window runs from 
1994q1 to 2005q1, and each successive data window is extended by one observation; hence, the last data window 
runs from 2005 to 2009 (this setup delivers 20 expanding windows).  From a policy point of view, this allows us to 
identify the evolution of the estimated model parameters over time and across regimes.  We use sequences of 
expanding windows in which the sample size for estimation is increased by one observation in each successive 
window, as opposed to sequences of fixed-length rolling windows, simply because the larger (increasing) windows 
help the estimation procedures for the various models, which can be quite parameter intensive. 
 
For robustness reasons, however, the exercise below also reports results based on a sequence of fixed-length 
rolling windows where each successive window is constructed by shifting the preceding window ahead by one 
observation. The rolling scheme can also be used to guard from moment or parameter drift due to the regime 
changes in fiscal policy, discussed in the preceding section; and on that basis, we believe it is worth comparing 
estimates from these two schemes.
5
 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The results of the nonlinear estimates are compared to the results of Du Plessis and Boshoff (2008), 
Swanepoel and Schoeman (2002), Lizondo et al. (2006) and Jooste (2009). Their results are summarized in Table 4. 
The different methods yield marginally different results. 
 
Table 5 includes the estimation results from our nonlinear regression. To calculate the expansion phase 
elasticity in the STR model (10), the sum of the linear and nonlinear part ,
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, is taken. The results differ 
significantly from the linear estimates in Table 4. The estimates indicate that strong asymmetries are present during 
the different phases of the cycle. During the upward phase of the cycle, a 1% increase in the wage bill, profits and 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that there has been some debate on using recursive versus fixed-length rolling windows, mainly in the context 
of forecasting. On the expanding window versus fixed-length rolling window issue we note that according to Stock and Watson 
(2005, p. 26), “recursive forecasts are more accurate than the rolling forecasts” for the representative macroeconomic dataset they 
study.  On the other hand, however, Giacomini and White (2006, p. 1566) find that a “rolling window procedure can result in 
substantial forecast accuracy gains relative to an expanding window for important economic time series.” 
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consumption, increases revenue collections by 1.87, 2.77 and 2.18 for PIT, CIT and VAT, respectively. Conversely, 
during the contraction phase of the cycle, revenue collection responds less than unity for PIT, CIT and VAT (though 
not significantly smaller than one). The elasiticities fall well within the range of elasticities reported in Table 4 when 
using equally weighted averages of the expansionary and contractionary elasticities for the various taxes. The 
nonlinear elasticities show that when the cycle suddenly turns, tax collections decrease quickly and by a lot. The 
results are robust in as much as the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) output gap is also used. The VAT estimates are not 
significant in the H-P gap regression and barely significant in the SVAR gap regression. Most studies assume that 
this elasticity takes a value of one. The strong asymmetries just show how fast revenues could grow during an 
expansionary phase, which partly explains why the government consistently underestimates tax revenue. 
Government’s expenditure decision can be greatly enhanced once these elasticities are incorporated, which would 
reduce overall surprises that might question the credibility of fiscal authorities.  
 
 
Table 4:  Linear Elasticities 
Taxes Swanepoel et al. Du Plessis et al. Lizondo et al. Jooste 
PIT   1.43 0.84 
CIT   2.52 1.79 
VAT  1.14 0.99 1.01 
Income and profits 1.04 1.05   
Goods and services 1.24    
 
 
Table 5:  Nonlinear Regression 
 PIT SVAR PIT H-P CIT SVAR CIT H-P VAT SVAR VAT H-P 
Linear Part 
Long run coefficient 
C -1.88** -2.70*** -12.48*** -11.49*** -8.32** -2.89 
[2.91] [0.65] [2.91] [3.85] [3.59] [2.84] 
^
o  
-0.26** -0.35*** -0.31** -0.24** -0.16* -0.17 
[0.11] [0.12] [0.13] [0.11] [0.08] [0.12] 
^
o  
0.23** 0.21*** 0.27** 0.21** 0.14* 0.14 
[0.10] [0.11] [0.11] [0.09] [0.07] [0.10] 
Nonlinear Part 
^
q  
-1.30** -1.46*** -0.81** -0.92** -1.25* -0.46 
[0.63] [0.40] [0.31] [0.37] [0.64] [0.52] 
^
q  
1.24** 1.48*** 1.54*** 1.65*** 1.65** 0.62 
[0.58] [0.39] [0.47] [0.56] [0.79] [0.63] 
Upward phase 
^
^
^
^
o
o
q
q







 
1.87 1.89 2.77 2.67 2.18 2.17 
Downward phase 
^
^
o
o



 
0.88 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.81 0.82 
2R  0.63 0.73 0.57 0.52 0.33 0.49 
SE 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.24 0.09 0.09 
JB 1.39 1.42 0.52 1.62 1.34 22.17 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.77) (0.30) (0.52) (0.00) 
Heteroskedasticity (0.17) (0.54) (0.51) (0.18) (0.28) (0.01) 
Serial Correlation (0.94) (0.98) (3.49) (0.12) (0.25) (0.70 
Model AIC -2.46 -2.70 -0.11 0.10 -1.73 -1.32 
Note: Parenthesis represents probability values and block parenthesis are standard errors. *,**,*** denote significance levels at 
10, 5 and 1 percent. One lag was used for the serial correlation test. 
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Fixed and rolling estimates were used to characterize the nonlinear estimates (equation 7) for 12 periods. 
The first row of Figures 1 and 2 is the nonlinear coefficients for the expansive phase and the second row is the 
contraction phase medium run coefficients. The nonlinear estimates in Figure 2 are constant over time. This suggests 
that correctly capturing asymmetries in the economy yields robust and invariant estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Rolling Parameters Of The Linear And Nonlinear Tax Elasticities 
Note: The black lines are the estimated fixed window rolling coefficients. The dashed lines represent standard errors 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Figure 2:  Recursive Parameters Of The Linear And Nonlinear Tax Elasticities 
Note: The black lines are the estimated fixed window rolling coefficients. The dashed lines represent standard errors 
 
 
Moving into South Africa’s longest contraction since the 1989-1993 period, policy makers should make 
additional precautions regarding the expenditure framework. What Figure 3 suggests is that the economy still has to 
purge itself from cyclical effects in order to have a conventional budget (CBB) that is in line with the structure of the 
economy. The difference in using the downward phase and upward phase elasticity is more than one per cent of 
GDP (close to R 30bn); i.e. as the cycle is correcting itself, we will have close to R30bn less to spend on the 
economy. Using the wrong elasticities would lead to a policy belief that there is an additional R30bn to spend during 
the downward phase of the cycle.  
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Figure 3: The SBB incorporating Different Coefficients Over The Cycle 
Note: SBB is as a percentage of potential GDP and CBB is as a percentage of nominal GDP 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper discusses two important issues regarding tax elasticities, the first being whether taxes respond 
symmetrically over the cycle and the second being whether tax elasticities are constant and stable over time. To 
answer these questions, we test for and estimate possible asymmetries through incorporating a nonlinear framework. 
The weighted averages of the nonlinear estimates are similar to those of other studies. However, the nonlinear 
estimates showed that tax collections indeed move asymmetrically over the cycle. This has significant implications 
for policy making in using the structural budget balance as a gauge for the overall fiscal stance. The study shows 
that applying these elastcities can lead to large differences in the structural budget balance. Fiscal hawks argue that 
fiscal austerity measures should be implemented as the global economy recovers. The estimates obtained in this 
study should serve as a tool in assessing future revenue collections and, hence, overall expenditures. These 
elasticities should guide policy makers’ decisions to ensure that expenditures will be met by revenue streams in the 
future and serve as an illuminating path to improved policy making. 
 
These estimates could well be affected by other factors that could possible bias the results. As a further line 
of research, estimating efficiency gains from the South African Revenue Services through improvements in tax 
collection and the underwriting of tax laws could render more accurate estimates.  
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